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MISSING THE TARGET: HOW PERFORMANCE-ENHANCING
DRUGS GO UNNOTICED AND ENDANGER
THE LIVES OF ATHLETES
I. INTRODUCTION
Sports are a partial reflection of societal norms and values.' In
that regard, culture and sports have their shortcomings as well as
their successes. 2 Although both areas have fallen to the epidemic
of drug addiction, the drug problem in the sports community still
remains somewhat of a mystery.3 Amateur and professional athletic
organizations implemented drug testing policies to determine
which players use illegal drugs and to deter others from trying
them.4 These "doping" policies require taking urine samples
throughout the year.5 Vials of urine are then analyzed for
1. See Dante Marrazzo, Athletes and Drug Testing: Why Do We Care if Athletes In-
hale?, 8 MARQ. SPORTS L.J. 75, 78 (1997) (describing athletes as microcosm of
society).
2. See Richard Pound, Performance-Enhancing Drugs in Sport: Response by the Inter-
national Sports Community, 55 INT'LJ. 485, 485 (2000). Pound identified that any
society or activity put together by a series of rules will tempt some members to
cheat. See id. To combat these swindlers, athletics and society instituted a series of
educational programs and sanctions to force them to comply with the rules. See id.
3. SeeJohn C. Martin, Comment, Drug Testing All Students: The Wrong Answer to
a Difficult Question, 6 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 123, 123 (1997) (noting public con-
cern over drug use by American society). It is speculated that many professional
athletes use performance-enhancing drugs to improve their play. See Steve Rosen-
bloom, Just Off the Tip of His Tongue; Rockies' Cirillo Takes Stand on Steroids-Almost,
CHI. TRiB., Mar. 25, 2001, at C13. The actual number of athletes who use these
drugs remains a mystery. See id. While interviewing Jeff Cirillo, the Colorado Ro-
ckies third baseman at the time, Rosenbloom stated that Cirillo refused to name
any players using performance-enhancing drugs because Cirillo did not "want[ ] to
be killed by his own troops." Id.
4. See Karen E. Crummy, Note, Urine or You're Out: Student Athletes' Right to
Privacy Stripped in Hill v. NCAA, 29 U.S.F. L. REv. 197, 198 (1994). The purpose of
the National Collegiate Athletic Association ("NCAA") drug testing policy was to
promote fair competition and to care for the health and safety of the student-
athletes. See id. (citing Hill v. NCAA, 865 P.2d 633, 659 (Cal. 1994)); see also Mar-
tin, supra note 3, at 124 (noting society looks to protect its young people and deter
drug use through drug testing policies).
5. See Kim Betz & Jill Pilgrim, A Journey Through Olympic Drug Testing Rules: A
Practitioner's Guide to Understanding Drug Testing Within the Olympic Movement, 2
VAND. J. ENT. L. & PR~c. 210, 212 (2000). "Doping" is the "use of an artifice,
potentially dangerous to the athletes' health and/or capable of enhancing their
performances." WADA, FAQ About Doping, at http://www.wada-ama.org/asiakas/
003/wada.english.nsf/Home?OpenPage (last visited Sept. 25, 2002) [hereinafter
FAQ About Doping]. Doping prevents competition based on "natural differences
[in] performance against each other." See Frank Oschitz, International Sports Law
(181)
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street drugs, and in specific instances, for performance-enhancing
drugs. 6
Drug testing policies, especially those in high schools and in
professional sports, are criticized for lenient policy administration
and testing too few substances. 7 At the crux of the debate are per-
formance-enhancing drugs that are left completely off the list of
tested substances in high school anti-doping schemes. 8 Profes-
sional sports organizations like the National Football League
("NFL") and Major League Baseball ("MLB") include performance-
enhancing drugs on their lists of banned substances, yet it is debata-
ble whether athletes are tested for these substances and whether
athletes' use of them is disclosed adequately to the media.9 The
Perspectives: Harmonization of A nti-Doping Code Through Arbitration: The Case Law of the
Court of Arbitration for Sport, 12 MARO. SPORTS L. REv. 675, 675 (2002).
6. See Oschuitz, supra note 5, at 675. Olympic athletes are subject to testing
during competitions and also during training, which is known as "out-of-competi-
tion" testing. See Betz & Pilgrim, supra note 5, at 212. Olympic athletes are
screened for drugs such as heroin and performance-enhancing drugs like anabolic
steroids. See World Anti-Doping Agency, List of Prohibited Substances and Methods, at
http://www.wada-ama.org/asiakas/003/wadaenglish.nsf/Home?OpenPage (last
visited Sept. 25, 2002) [hereinafter List of Prohibited Substances and Methods]. NCAA
lists heroin, marijuana, and THC as street drugs. See NCAA Banned-Drug Classes, at
http://www.ncaa.com/sports-sciences/drugtesting/banned_list.html. (last visited
Sept. 25, 2002).
7. See Daniel P. Fox, Comment, Structural Barriers in Antidoping Measures, 8
SPORTS LAw. J. 271, 277 (2001) (stating National Football League conducts drug
testing in "sloppy" manner because testing is merely public relations strategy). Fox
details how the National Football League will never correctly administer its drug
testing policy on its athletes because "exposure of such drug use would directly
injure the NFL's own image and income .... Id. at 278.
8. See, e.g., Bd. of Educ. v. Earls, 122 S. Ct. 2559, 2569 (2002) (extending drug
testing beyond athletics to other extracurricular athletics); Miller v. Wilkes, 172
F.3d 574, 576 (8th Cir. 1999), vacated as moot sub nom., Miller ex rel. Miller v. Wilkes,
No. 98-3227, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 13289, at *1 (8th Cir. June 15, 1999) (uphold-
ing testing policy requiring students who desired to participate in extracurricular
activities to submit to urine testing that tested only for illegal drugs and alcohol);
Trinidad Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Lopez, 963 P.2d 1095, 1110 (Colo. 1998) (ruling un-
constitutional drug testing policy of high school students that tested for illegal
drugs); see also Vernonia Sch. Dist. v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 650-51 (1995) (uphold-
ing policy requiring testing of high school students for amphetamines, cocaine,
marijuana, and occasionally LSD).
9. See Fox, supra note 7, at 278. Fox argued that the NFL has a need to cover
up any potential doping by its athletes because the NFL as a national organization
is entirely dependent on the revenues from the sport. See id. He then stated that
the NFL has a structural incentive to condone or even promote the use of perform-
ance-enhancing drugs because of its desire to generate revenues. See id. at 277.
The issue of performance-enhancing drugs in MLB has been debated because of
the recent rise in home runs. See Rosenbloom, supra note 3, at C13. Mark
McGwire, the baseball slugger who broke the season-long home-run record in the
late 1990s, brought more attention to the subject because of his promotion of
substances such as androstenedione and creatine, both of which can be purchased
2
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bottom line is, a doping problem exists in all levels of all sports.10
The remedy to this problem must extend beyond mandatory drug
testing. 11
This Comment focuses on the anti-doping policies of different
athletic organizations and groups within both the amateur and pro-
fessional ranks. Section II examines the drug testing policies of as-
sorted athletic settings, using high school athletics, the National
Collegiate Athletic Association ("NCAA"), and the World Anti-Dop-
ing Agency ("WADA") as examples of amateur sports, as well as the
NFL and MLB to contrast the anti-doping policies that exist within
the professional sports arena. 12 Section III discusses the frustra-
tions encountered by these policies, using the field of available per-
formance-enhancing drugs as a gauge for the policies' successes
and failures. 13 Section IV briefly summarizes the shortcomings of
contemporary anti-doping policies, and suggests ways organizations
can improve their efforts to eradicate the use of performance-en-
hancing drugs.1 4
II. BACKGROUND
The problem of doping in sports pervades both amateur and
professional athletic organizations. 15 The differences in their ap-
"over-the-counter." See Joe Kolb, Education, Testing Are the Key to Reducing Doping by
Athletes, ALBUQUERQUE J., Oct. 26, 2000, at Bi.
10. See David J. Greenblatt, Urine Drug Testing: What Does It Test?, 23 NEw ENG.
L. REv. 651, 651 (1989) (noting abuse and misuse of both street drugs and ana-
bolic steroids by athletes concern American society).
11. See Martin, supra note 3, at 13940. Martin stated that testing procedures
implemented in school systems have taken away the students' presumption of in-
nocence and unreasonably stripped away their right to privacy. See id. Other ex-
perts agree, believing that the benefits of urine testing fail to rise to the level
needed to justify the infringement on constitutionally protected freedoms. See
Greenblatt, supra note 10, at 665 (arguing it is highly questionable whether per-
ceived benefits of drug testing outweigh loss of constitutionally guaranteed protec-
tions and freedoms).
12. For a discussion of the anti-doping measures taken by a few amateur ath-
letic sections and organizations, as well as the response to the drug problem in the
professional arena, see infra notes 23-96 and accompanying text.
13. For a discussion of how current drug testing policies are neglecting to
correctly combat the problem of performance-enhancing drugs in today's sports
world, see infra notes 97-154 and accompanying text.
14. For a summary of the critique of contemporary anti-doping policies and a
look at new ways in which these measures may be improved, see infra notes 155-80
and accompanying text.
15. See Vernonia Sch. Dist. v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 649 (1995) (noting district
court finding that athletes in Vernonia schools were leaders of drug culture); see
also Survey: Alarming Number of Youths Use Performance Drugs, ALCOHOLISM AND DRUG
ABUSE WKLY., Sept. 10, 2001, at 6 [hereinafter Survey] (finding one in five Ameri-
can youths knew someone taking performance-enhancing drugs to assist him or
3
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proaches have been drastic, with professional sports' emphasis on
counseling and amateur sports' focus on testing.16 The regulation
of substance policies in professional sports has been limited be-
cause the Supreme Court has only evaluated the constitutionality of
drug policies under the Fourth Amendment as applied to high
school drug testing.17 Anti-doping measures of other sports levels
remain untouched by the courts, and have been amended only
through administrative processes and collective bargaining
agreements.'
Because most athletic institutions have been deemed private
actors by the courts, they administer their drug testing mechanisms
with more freedom than high school athletic programs. 19 There-
fore, many experts have concluded that professional sports and
her in athletic performance). Doping scandals have become commonplace, such
as the 1998 Tour de France drug scandal, where individual cyclists, as well as whole
cycling teams, were arrested due to searches that uncovered performance-enhanc-
ing drug use by athletes. See Fox, supra note 7, at 271.
16. See Marrazzo, supra note 1, at 79 (noting initial reaction to doping by ath-
letes was drug testing). The NCAA implemented its drug testing policy in 1986 in
response to this perception, while the United States Olympic Committee
("USOC") had done the same a year earlier. See id.
17. See Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 664-65 (holding drug testing policy that tested
students participating in extracurricular athletic activities to be reasonable and
constitutional). The Supreme Court has issued decisions on anti-doping or drug
testing policies in the area of employment, another arena in which the govern-
ment has tried to deter the use of illegal drugs. See, e.g., Skinner v. Ry. Labor
Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 634 (1989) (ruling Fourth Amendment allowed
drug testing policy due to higher government interest in safety and lower individ-
ual expectation of privacy).
18. See Long v. NFL, 870 F. Supp. 101, 105 (W.D. Pa. 1994) (holding NFL was
not state actor and therefore not subject to Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments).
Terry Long, then a player for the Pittsburgh Steelers, tested positive for anabolic
steroids. See id. at 103. He argued that the drug testing policy of the NFL violated
his rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States
Constitution. See id. The NFL sought to dismiss the action through a 12(b)(6)
motion, arguing that it was not a state actor. See id. The court agreed, and ulti-
mately ruled for the NFL, finding an insufficient nexus between the state and the
NFL. See id. at 105. The NCAA has also been deemed a private actor, and there-
fore free from the constraints of the Constitution. See NCAA v. Tarkanian, 488
U.S. 179, 198-99 (1988) (ruling university's action in accordance with policies of
NCAA did not make NCAA state actor).
19. See Crummy, supra note 4, at 217 (noting NCAA's vast control over col-
legiate athletics (citing Hill v. NCAA, 865 P.2d 633, 660 (Cal. 1994))). Crummy
argued that such unilateral control in this area by the NCAA should give courts
more incentive to find a violation of a student-athlete's right against unreasonable
searches and seizures. See id. In Hill, the California Supreme Court found that the
NCAA was not a state actor, and the California Constitution afforded the athletes
some right to privacy against private organizations. See id. at 211 (citing Hill, 865
P.2d at 644). The court concluded, however, that the policy was constitutional
because the athletes' lower expectation of privacy was outweighed by the NCAA's
objectives in testing. See Hill, 865 P.2d at 637.
4
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some amateur athletic organizations manipulate the amount of ex-
posure that doping problems receive.20 Furthermore, some drug
tests have failed to identify correctly past drug use by an athlete. 21
In response to these criticisms, athletic organizations have at-
tempted to enact anti-doping programs that address these
concerns.
22
A. Amateur Athletics
1. Drug Testing Policies at the High School Level
Educational institutions have become a focal point for Ameri-
can culture and public growth.23 In Elkins v. United States,24 the
Court held that the Search and Seizure Clause of the Fourth
Amendment applied to states through the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.2 5 In T.L.O. v. New Jersey,26 the Court held that the Fourth
Amendment applied to school officials because they "act as repre-
sentatives of the State, not merely as surrogates for parents . *..."27
No matter how important the societal function, the Court has al-
ways sought to balance the students' interests against the state's
20. See Notebook: U.S. Accused of Encouraging Drug Use; Sydney 2000: Summer
Olympics Special Section, ATLANTA J. & CONST., Oct. 1, 2000, at 5D [hereinafter
Notebook]. Quoting the USOC's former medical chief, Dr. Robert Voy, the article
stated that the USOC has covered up positive drug results by its athletes and that
such practices would likely continue in the future. See id.
21. See Greenblatt, supra note 10, at 660 (noting person can stop taking drugs
weeks before administration of test and pass). The author believed that the NCAA
and the International Olympic Committee ("IOC") used urine testing under a
false premise that anabolic steroids were dangerous enough to warrant infringe-
ment on an athlete's privacy. See id. at 665-66.
22. See Pound, supra note 2, at 487 (noting in Olympic movement, IOC Medi-
cal Commission was created after concern for athletes' health relating to perform-
ance-enhancing drugs arose).
23. See Vernonia Sch. Dist. v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 661-63 (noting states have
compelling interest in educating children). The Vernonia Court determined that
the state's need for drug testing was compelling because drugs can disrupt the
educational process and cause potential health problems to children. See id.
24. 364 U.S. 206 (1960).
25. See id. at 223. The Fourth Amendment provides that the Federal Govern-
ment shall not violate "the right of people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures ...." U.S. CONST.
amend. IV. The Fourteenth Amendment mandates that "[n]o State ... shall...
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S.
CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
26. 469 U.S. 325 (1985).
27. Id. at 336. In holding that public school officials were state actors, the
Court rejected the notion that they act in similar capacity as parents. See id.
5
Walker: Missing the Target: How Performance-Enhancing Drugs Go Unnoticed
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2003
186 VILLANOVA SPORTS & ENT. LAw JouPNAL [Vol. 10: p. 181
goals under the Fourth Amendment.28 For students to receive pro-
tection, there must be an intrusion on an expectation of privacy
"society is 'prepared to recognize as legitimate.' -29 This interest is
weighed against the government's interest in educating children.30
According to the Supreme Court, drug testing through urine is
a search and seizure because it "intrudes upon expectations of pri-
vacy that society has long recognized as reasonable .... "31 Nor-
mally, the Fourth Amendment requires that officials obtain a
warrant through probable cause before conducting any kind of
search, but the Court applied the less exacting "special needs" doc-
trine in the public school setting because the probable cause re-
quirement would hinder educational needs.32 In Vernonia School
District v. Acton,33 the Court alleviated the need for the school to
obtain a warrant before testing student-athletes for drugs because
athletes have a diminished expectation of privacy.3 4
After the ruling in Acton, school boards acted quickly to imple-
ment similar drug testing programs. 35 Drug testing and policies
28. See Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 652-53 (citing Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives'
Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 619 (1989)). In Vernonia, the Court stated that the overall
Fourth Amendment inquiry was whether the search was "reasonable," but also
noted that it would not forget the custodial nature inherent in a school system. See
id. at 656.
29. See T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 338 (citing Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 526
(1984)). In T7L.O., the Court held that the Fourth Amendment applied to school
officials. See id. at 341.
30. See Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 660-61 (finding government interest to be "com-
pelling" in deterring drug use and educating students); see also Bd. of Educ. v.
Earls, 122 S. Ct. 2559, 2569 (2002) (reaffirming principles dictated in Vernonia for
testing students participating in extracurricular activities).
31. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 617 (holding urine testing of railroad employees con-
stitutes search under Fourth Amendment).
32. See T7L.O., 469 U.S. at 332 n.2. In T7L.O., a local high school teacher
"discovered two girls smoking in a lavatory," which violated school policy. See id. at
328. The girls were taken to the principal's office, where the plaintiff denied that
she was smoking. See id. The assistant vice principal opened the girl's purse, where
he found cigarettes and rolling papers commonly associated with marijuana. See
id. Further investigation revealed a "small amount of marijuana, a pipe" and other
accessories implicating the plaintiff for the possible distribution of drugs. See id.
The plaintiff challenged the search by the school official on Fourth Amendment
grounds, but the Court upheld the search, ruling the usual probable cause require-
ment would hinder proper education administration. See id. at 340-41. The Court
therefore determined that "school officials need not obtain a warrant before
searching a student who is under their authority." Id. at 340. The special needs of
the school environment require assessment of the legality of such searches against
a standard less exacting than probable cause. See id. at 332 n.2.
33. 515 U.S. 646 (1995).
34. See id. at 653 (applying T7L.O. principles to suspicionless searches and
seizures of student-athletes through drug testing).
35. See, e.g., Miller v. Wilkes, 172 F.3d 574, 576 (8th Cir. 1999), vacated as moot
sub nom., Miller ex reL Miller v. Wilkes, No. 98-3227, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 13289,
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prohibiting the consumption of alcohol were deemed to protect ad-
equately the health and safety of the student-athlete.3 6 The Su-
preme Court in Vernonia ruled that considerations such as the
health and safety of the students were valid and "perhaps compel-
ling" government concerns. 3 7
The Court further elaborated its desire for eradicating drug
problems in Board of Education v. Earls.3 8 The Court's ruling in Earls
extended the principles of Vernonia to include students who partici-
pate in non-athletic extracurricular activities.39 The policy insti-
tuted by the school district tested for illegal street drugs, but not for
at *1 (8th Cir. June 15, 1999) (upholding school board's drug testing program that
inquires as to students' use of "street drugs"); Todd v. Rush County Sch., 133 F.3d
984, 986-87 (7th Cir. 1998) (ruling random, suspicionless student drug testing pro-
gram, which exposed illegal drug, nicotine, and alcohol usage, was constitutional).
The random drug testing policy in Vernonia tested only for amphetamines, co-
caine, and marijuana. See Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 650. A screening done for any
other drugs would have to be specially requested by the school district. See id. at
650-51.
36. See Butler v. Oak Creek-Franklin Sch. Dist., 172 F. Supp. 2d 1102, 1116
(E.D. Wis. 2001) (ruling school training code unconstitutional because it denied
student due process under Fourteenth Amendment). Oak Creek Iigh School's
Training Code did not allow students who participated in athletics to consume or
possess "alcoholic beverages or controlled substances; [to violate] any criminal law
or local ordinance; and [to gather] where minors are partaking of alcohol or
drugs." Id. at 1107. Butler was found in violation of the Training Code several
times for possession of drugs, attendance at a function where alcohol was being
served to minors, and violation of a local ordinance, resulting in a twelve-month
athletic suspension. See id. at 1107-08. Butler challenged the ruling dependant on
the violation of the local ordinances, stating that he was deprived due process
under the training code. See id. at 1107. The ordinances related to unlawful pos-
session of intoxicants, unlawful possession of fireworks, and disorderly conduct.
See id. The district court found a possible deprivation of rights because the person
who recommended the suspension, the athletic director of the school, also partici-
pated in the hearing that reviewed the disciplinary decision. See id. at 1116. Under
the Fourteenth Amendment, "the government official charged with recom-
mending a particular decision must not participate in making the actual decision,
and the official who makes an initial decision must not participate in making the
final decision." Id. at 1115. The court, therefore, vacated the decision of the
"Coaches' Council." See id. at 1127.
37. See Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 661. The Court stated the government interest
may rise to the level of compelling because drugs pose such a risk to the students'
physical capabilities, and they put other athletes who are playing against the drug
users at a serious risk. See id. at 662.
38. 122 S. Ct. 2559 (2002).
39. See id. The Supreme Court once again balanced the government interest
against the concerns of the students. See id. When judging the immediacy of the
concern, it relied more heavily on the general drug problem among all students
rather than the actual drug problem at the school. See id. at 2562-63. The Court
ruled that the school district had shown some evidence of a substance abuse prob-
lem to justify the testing. See id. at 2568-69.
7
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performance-enhancing drugs. 40 Consequently, the decision al-
lowed school districts to update their policies to combat the devel-
oping drug situation among students.41
Only one case has involved a challenge to a drug testing policy
that detected the presence of both performance-enhancing drugs
and street drugs. 42 This is because most school districts limit their
anti-doping policies to street drugs to adhere to the Fourth and
Fourteenth Amendment standards. 43
2. NCAA's Anti-Doping Policy
The NCAA has been an innovator in the fight against drug use
by athletes in detecting the intake of both street drugs and perform-
ance-enhancing substances. 44 The organization has dealt only with
state constitutional and First Amendment challenges to the policy,
and not with opposition based on the Search and Seizure Clause of
the Fourth Amendment.45 If the actions of the state and private
40. See id. The policy tested for marijuana, cocaine, amphetamines, opiates,
and barbiturates. See id. at 2563.
41. See id. at 2568-69. The Court specifically noted that the drug problem had
not abated since Vernonia, as it had hoped. See id. at 2567. High school policies,
therefore, could test for performance-enhancing drugs for purely preventative
measures without demonstrating a serious doping problem. See id. at 2568 (citing
Nat'l Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 673 (1989)).
42. See Miller v. Wilkes, 172 F.3d 574, 582 (8th Cir. 1999), vacated as moot sub
nom., Miller ex rel. Miller v. Wilkes, No. 98-3227, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 13289, at *1
(8th Cir. June 15, 1999) (holding that drug testing policy that included testing for
"misused prescription drugs" was constitutional). It does not appear, however,
that this policy was intended to reach performance-enhancing drugs. See id. It was
aimed at the misuse of "street drugs" because the policy was directed at all extra-
curricular activities, notjust athletics. See id. at 577. But see Schul v. Sherard, 102 F.
Supp. 2d 877, 891 (S.D. Ohio 2000) (dismissing suit by former track coach chal-
lenging dismissal for advocating caffeine to athletes as performance-enhancing
drug). Schul challenged his dismissal under the First, Fourth, and Fourteenth
Amendments, but the district court dismissed all of the claims. See id. at 887, 891.
43. See Martin, supra note 3, at 123 (suggesting high costs and uncertain law
have deterred most high schools from enacting drug testing policies). Martin con-
cluded, however, that recent case law may provide clearer legal guidance for test-
ing. See id.
44. See Crummy, supra note 4, at 198 (noting NCAA adopted first drug testing
policy in 1986). The NCAA is "an organization through which the nation's col-
leges and universities speak and act on athletics matters at the national level. It is a
voluntary association of approximately 1,200 institutions, conferences, organiza-
tions and individuals devoted to the sound administration of intercollegiate athlet-
ics." What is the NCAA?, at http://www.ncaa.com/about/what.is-thencaa.html
(last visited Sept. 25, 2002). The original intent of the NCAA's anti-doping policy
was to "ensure fair competition and protect the health and safety of student-ath-
letes." Crummy, supra note 4, at 198 (citing Hill v. NCAA, 865 P.2d 633, 659 (Cal.
1994)).
45. See NCAA v. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 179, 199 (1988) (ruling NCAA was not
state actor when it imposed sanctions on University of Nevada-Las Vegas). In the
[Vol. 10: p. 181
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party are so intertwined and indistinguishable that they become
joint participants, the private party is considered a state actor.46
The NCAA has not been deemed a state actor for purposes of im-
posing its policies on member colleges and universities, and there-
fore has evaded Fourth Amendment constraint.47
The NCAA refined its anti-doping procedure, making athletes
consent to the policy by signing a release allowing random test-
ing.48 Testing is implemented according to strict procedures.49
Drug-testing crews pass the specimens of urine to the representa-
tives of the National Center for Drug-Free Sports at the champion-
ship site. 50 The collected urine samples are checked for an
Hill decision, the California Supreme Court determined that the NCAA was a pri-
vate actor, and therefore only had to prove a compelling need for its drug test that
outweighed the students' right to privacy. See Hill, 865 P.2d at 637. Hill involved
Stanford University athletes who refused to consent to drug testing before the sea-
son began. See Crummy, supra note 4, at 207-08. After the trial court and the court
of appeals found for the plaintiff athletes, the California Supreme Court reversed
and found for the NCAA. See id. at 209-10. The drug-testing scheme was not an
invasion of privacy because the NCAA's interest in conducting the testing over-
came the student athlete's limited expectation of privacy. See Hill, 865 P.2d at 637.
Therefore, the defendant did not commit a serious invasion of privacy under state
law. See id. at 637, 657.
46. See Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 724-25 (1961). Bur-
ton involved a leasing arrangement between a private restaurant and a public park-
ing facility. See id. at 724. The restaurant was deemed a state actor and violated the
Fourteenth Amendment for discriminatory practices. See id. at 725. State action
can also be found if the state delegates authority for the act to a private party. See
Tarkanian, 488 U.S. at 195.
47. See Tarkanian, 488 U.S. at 199 (holding NCAA was not state actor in rec-
ommending sanctions against basketball coach); see also Hill, 865 P.2d at 643 (find-
ing state constitution applied to private, nongovernmental organizations, but only
privacy rights were enforceable).
48. See NCAA Drug Testing Program Book, at http://www.ncaa.com/library/
sports-sciences/drug-testing-program/2002-03/drugTestingProgram.pdf (last
visited Sept. 25, 2002) [hereinafter Program Book]. The consent statement must be
signed before the athlete begins the intercollegiate season, or else he or she is not
permitted to compete for that season. See id. Drug testing usually occurs at NCAA
Championships for the particular sport, and the NCAA has implemented more
stringent testing in some areas, such as subjecting Division I-A, I-AA, and II football
players to year-round testing. See id. Many critics of the NCAA drug testing policy
have noted that the consent form amounts to coercion because the athlete will be
prohibited from playing in any intercollegiate sport if he or she fails to sign the
form. See Crummy, supra note 4, at 221. This may jeopardize the athlete's scholar-
ship, if he or she has one. See id.
49. See Drug Testing Program: Drug-testing Q&A, at http://www.ncaa.org/news/
2001/20010507/active/3810n15.html (May 7, 2001) [hereinafter Drug-testing
Q&A].
50. See id. The NCAA procedures also provide that the student-athlete, when
called upon to be tested, must produce a full specimen (greater than eighty-five
milliliters), or else the athlete will be required to produce a new specimen. See
Program Book, supra note 48, at 6.0. The specimen is split into two "vials," one
labeled "A" and the other "B." See id. If the athlete has to leave the collection
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extensive list of banned substances such as anabolic steroids and
diuretics.51
A positive test result for any of the substances renders the ath-
lete ineligible for any further contests until he or she obtains a neg-
ative test.52 If there is a second positive finding, the student is
allowed an institutional appeal, which must be submitted in writing
within forty-eight hours of notification.53 If the athlete's request for
eligibility is denied, he or she may be reinstated only after produc-
ing a negative test sample.54
The main purpose of the NCAA anti-doping policy has been to
"protect[ ] the health and safety of intercollegiate athletes. '55
Many of the tested drugs have serious side effects known to the
medical community.56 The public has become aware of the possi-
ble pernicious effects of anabolic agents, such as serious contribu-
tion to liver damage in steroid users.57 Therefore, the NCAA has
station (after approval by the crew-chief), then upon return, he or she must pro-
duce an entire specimen again and the first specimen is discarded. See id.
51. See Crummy, supra note 4, at 206. This list of banned substances includes
stimulants, anabolic agents, diuretics, street drugs, peptide hormones, and ana-
logues, but does not strictly regulate nutrition supplements. See Drug-Testing Pro-
gram: NCAA Banned Drug-Classes, at http://www.ncaa.com/sports-sciences/drug
testing/bannedlist.html (last visited Oct. 21, 2002) [hereinafter NCAA Banned
Drug-Classes]. Anabolic agents, such as anabolic steroids, "are a series of com-
pounds closely related in structure to the naturally occurring hormone, cortisone."
Greenblatt, supra note 10, at 662. Anabolic steroids help the development of new
tissue, thereby increasing body weight and muscle mass. See id.
52. See Program Book, supra note 48. If after thirty days of providing of the
specimen by the athlete, he or she has not received the results, the drug test is
assumed to be negative. See id. at 8.0. If the first test is positive, the athletic direc-
tor and the student-athlete are given notice, and "vial B" is tested, with the student-
athlete's option to attend this further procedure. See id.
53. See id. at 8.2.2.B.1. The appeal is conducted over the telephone, and the
athlete's participation is mandatory. See id.
54. See id. at 9.0. The protocol states that a drug test must take place even
before the student is considered for eligibility reinstatement. See id.
55. Eric N. Miller, Comment, Suspicionless Drug Testing of High School and Col-
lege Athletes After Acton: Similarities and Differences, 45 U. KAN. L. REV. 301, 323
(1996) (citing Univ, of Colo. v. Derdeyn, 863 P.2d 929, 943 (Colo. 1993)). Other
rationales for the NCAA drug testing program include promoting the integrity of
athletics, deterring drug use by other students, and ensuring fair competition. See
id. The health of the athlete is at risk because use of sports products can "adversely
affect the body and pose significant danger to consumers." Jennifer J. Spokes,
Note, Confusion in Dietary Supplement Regulation: The Sports Products Irony, 77 B.U. L.
REv. 181, 194 (1997). Products such as creatine, an over-the-counter supplement,
may lead to the development of kidney stones. See Kolb, supra note 9, at BI. This
product cannot be distributed or ingested under NCAA rules. See id.
56. See Kolb, supra note 9, at BI (stating side-effects of androstenodione, or
andro, include heart disease, acne, and mood swings).
57. See Greenblatt, supra note 10, at 663-64. Other side effects include in-
creased aggressiveness, dysfunctions in sexual activity, muscle cramps, breast en-
largement, and possible fertility complications. See id. As the author notes,
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kept drug testing in its athletic program to ensure that intercollegi-
ate athletics remain steroid-free. 58
3. The Olympic Movement and Anti-Doping
Performance-enhancing drugs have plagued the Olympics
since their inception in ancient Greece.59 The extent of the doping
problem in the Olympics, however, was not actually realized until
the 1950s and 1960s. 60 Because "the side effects of the substances
used were unclear," the International Olympic Committee ("IOC")
created a Medical Commission, which developed the initial list of
banned substances. 61 To fully prohibit the use of banned sub-
stances, the IOC asked international federations such as the United
States Olympic Committee ("USOC") to test for performance-en-
hancing drugs during non-competition. 62
however, most of these side effects are reversible if the user stops taking anabolic
agents. See id. at 664.
58. See Crummy, supra note 4, at 226 (noting Hill court found drug testing to
be deterrent to others considering drug use). Although some experts have stated
that drug testing is a deterrent, this conclusion has not been proven successfully.
See id. at 226-27. Furthermore, some have advocated that drug testing is the wrong
method to stop drug use in sports. See Greenblatt, supra note 10, at 659 (arguing
that highly accurate gas chormatographymass spectroscopy (GC-MS) test, albeit
expensive and infrequently used, is only way to properly administer drug testing).
Education about performance-enhancing drugs has not been received well either.
See Crummy, supra note 4, at 229 (noting Hill court did not see education as viable
alternative to drug testing). The NCAA recommends drug education along with
its other programs, but this is not mandatory for the institutions. See Drug-testing
Q&A, supra note 49. High school students know very little about the serious ef-
fects of performance-enhancing drugs. See Survey, supra note 15, at 6. It is unlikely
that college athletes understand the side effects of performance-enhancing drugs
because education programs are not a mandatory part of anti-doping policies. See
id. (finding seventy percent of students and fifty percent of parents could not re-
call single side effect of performance-enhancing drugs when asked).
59. See George Diaz, Citius, Altius, Fortius; Swifter, Higher, Stronger; Olympic Ath-
letes Such as Merion Jones Inspire Awe but the Incredible Performances of Many Athletes
Leave Doubts as to How They Became So Good, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Sept. 15, 2000, at
G3 (observing at inaugural Olympics, athletes consumed testicles of dogs and
sheep to achieve better results).
60. See Pound, supra note 2, at 486. The drug problem was exposed in the
1950s when weightlifters used testosterone to increase muscle mass, and in 1960
when a Danish cyclist died from the use of stimulants. See id.
61. Id. at 487. The Commission noted, however, that once it banned these
substances, the use of any performance-enhancing drug would go strictly under-
ground. See id.
62. See id. The IOC urged international federations, national Olympic com-
mittees, and national federations to adopt its anti-doping policy, which most have
done. See id. at 488. Whether these similar policies are enforced as strictly as the
IOC enforces its own policy remains a mystery. See Notebook, supra note 20, at 5D
(stating USOC encouraged use of performance-enhancing drugs in program).
USA Track and Field, however, has the right to randomly administer "out of com-
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The Olympic movement has been eager to coordinate a coher-
ent drug testing structure for its athletes.63 In 1999, the IOC called
a conference, now known as the Lausanne Declaration, to draw sup-
port for one body of code overseeing all of the anti-doping move-
ment for Olympic athletes.64 This conference created the Olympic
Movement Anti-Doping Code, enforced by the newly formed World
Anti-Doping Agency ("WADA"), which "applie[d] to all athletes,
coaches, instructors, officials, and to all medical and . . . [other]
staff working with athletes .... "65 The WADA has taken an inde-
pendent observer role at the Olympic Games, seeking to ensure
that testing is implemented in a correct and impartial manner. 66
petition" drug testing, usually not giving the athlete advance notice of when the
testing occurs. See Betz & Pilgrim, supra note 5, at 212.
63. See Richard M. McLaren, The Court of Arbitration for Sport: An Independent
Arena for the World's Sports Disputes, 35 VAL. U. L. REV. 379, 380-81 (2001) (arguing
Court of Arbitration for Sport, established by IOC in 1983, which reinforces goals
of World Anti-Doping Agency, should be final appeal of athlete accused of dop-
ing). The Olympic movement consists of "the [IOC], Organising Committees of
the Olympic Games ('OCOGs'), the National Olympic Committees ('NOCs'), the
International Federations ('IFs'), the national associations, clubs and the athletes."
Who Is the Olympic Movement, at http://www.olympic.org/uk/organisation/index
uk.asp (last visited Sept. 25, 2002). The IOC and other international sports agen-
cies do not have to deal with Fourth Amendment issues because the Court has
deemed them to be private actors. See S.F. Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. United States.
Olympic Comm., 483 U.S. 522, 547 (1987) (ruling USOC was not government ac-
tor and therefore right to enforce exclusive use of word "Olympic" was not uncon-
stitutionally discriminatory). In that case, the Supreme Court examined the
implementation of the Amateur Sports Act, which gave the USOC the exclusive
right to use the word "Olympic" and any symbols associated with it. See id. at 526.
The USOC sued for an injunction to stop the defendant from using the word
"Olympic" in its games. See id. at 527. The defendant argued that the Act was
discriminatory under the Fifth Amendment, but the Court disagreed, ruling that
the USOC was not a government actor. See id. at 542, 547.
64. See Pound, supra note 2, at 487. The code was supposed to represent all
"six constituencies," the IOC, the National Olympic Committees, the international
federations, athletes, governmental agencies, and experts. See id. The IOC ac-
cepted the contention, but the governments would have to pay for half of the costs
of the agency, and thus the six constituencies were not equally represented. See id.
The Lausanne Declaration provided for an independent anti-doping agency by the
2000 Olympic Games in Sydney. See WADA, About WADA: History, at http://www.
wada-ama.org/asiakas/003/wada-english.nsf/Home?OpenPage (last visited Sept.
3, 2002). The international agency was created to "promote and coordinate at the
international level the fight against doping in sport. . .. ." Id. Because the timing
of the conference seemed ill-fated, however, the governments represented at the
conference demanded they and the Olympic movement organizations share the
same weight of authority over the agency and the code enforcement. See Pound,
supra note 2, at 487.
65. Id. at 488. The Code and the WADA were in force during the Sydney
Olympics held in the summer of 2000. See id.
66. See WADA, Independent Observers Program, at http://www.wada-ama.org/
asiakas/003/wadaenglish.nsf/Home?OpenPage (last visited Sept. 25, 2002). The
WADA not only observes at the Games, but also goes to various sports' champion-
[Vol. 10: p. 181
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The WADA and the Olympic Movement Anti-Doping Code
have created a vast list of banned substances for which athletes are
tested at various times throughout their careers. 67 An athlete can
be tested at any time regardless of whether the games are in ses-
sion.68 If asked to produce a sample, the athlete is accompanied by
a monitor of the same sex.69 The anti-doping effort was not unified
until the emergence of WADA, so it may take time before all the
organizations have the identical policy.70 The WADA, therefore,
must wait before all the WADA doping policies are encoded and
are uniformly enforced at every single event.71
B. Professional Sports
1. The National Football League's Drug Policy
The NFL has been touted for its steroid testing policy, but criti-
cized for the policy's results. 72 The NFL drug testing policy was
established through collective bargaining with the NFL Players As-
ships to oversee their drug testing procedures and to make sure everything is im-
plemented properly. See id.
67. See List of Prohibited Substances and Methods, supra note 6. The WADA and
the Anti-Doping Code prohibit all use of street drugs, anabolic steroids, beta-block-
ers, and diuretics by the athletes under their control, as well as the use of blood
doping. See FAQ About Doping, supra note 5. Blood doping "involves the intrave-
nous administration of blood, red blood cells and related blood products to raise
the blood's oxygen-carrying capacity, thus enhancing aerobic athletic perform-
ance." Id. Since the 2000 Sydney Olympics, the drug erythropoitin, or EPO, has
been a tested banned substance for many of the summer and winter sports. See
Thorpe Attacks FINA Stance on Testing, at http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/more/
news/2001/07/24/worldsdrugsap/ (July 24, 2001) [hereinafter Thorpe Attacks].
EPO boosts production of oxygen-carrying red blood cells and assists the athlete's
endurance in competition. See id. EPO, which can only be detected through
blood samples, is now tested through the new IOC testing policy, which involves a
blood-urine combination. See id.
68. See FAQ About Doping, supra note 5.
69. See id. (stating to prevent cheating, same-sex "chaperones" accompany ath-
letes when sample is produced). The top four finishers and a randomly chosen
athlete from the rest of the field are tested after the event. See 2 ROBERT C. BERRY
& GLENN M. WONG, LAW AND THE BUSINESS OF SPORTS INDUSTRIES: COMMON ISSUES
IN AMATEUR AND PROFESSIONAL SPORTS 475 (Auburn House 1986).
70. See Betz & Pilgrim, supra note 5, at 216 (explaining USOC will oversee
testing for events within United States, while other organizations will administer
policies for Olympic Games and international events); see also Drug Chief Says IAA1;
IOC Should Ban USA Track, at http://sports.espn.go.com/oly/winter02/gen/news?
id=1322628 (Feb. 4, 2002) [hereinafter Drug Chiej] (reporting officials have
pleaded with USA Track to release names of athletes who tested positive before
2000 Olympic Games).
71. See Pound, supra note 2, at 492 (asserting only if every country applies
standards consistently will drug use in sports be eradicated).
72. SeeFox, supra note 7, at 276-77 (noting that both NFL executives and play-
ers want to sell football to public for profit, creating economic incentive for players
to use performance-enhancing drugs).
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sociation ("NFLPA").73 The NFL is not subject to constitutional re-
straints applied to entities such as public school districts because
the court has not declared the NFL to be a state actor.74 The NFL
sought tougher principles through year-long random drug testing,
but was unable to overcome NFLPA's pressure for less frequent
testing. 75
The current collective bargaining agreement between the NFL
and the NFLPA was struck in 1998, and has been extended through
2007.76 The NFL's banned substances list is one of the most com-
prehensive of the professional sports associations, including almost
as many substances as WADA's list. 77 The testing, however, is not as
frequent as the NCAA's or WADA's testing because most players are
only tested once during the NFL pre-season. 78 Also, the testing for
73. See id. at 275. The negotiations also addressed player salaries and condi-
tions of employment. See id.
74. See, e.g., Long v. NFL, 870 F. Supp. 101, 105 (W.D. Pa. 1994) (holding that
NFL and Pittsburgh Steelers did not meet requirements of state actor test). For
further discussion on Long, see supra note 18 and accompanying text.
75. See Drug Policy: Testing for Substances of Abuse: Types of Testing, at http://
www.nflpa.org/members/main.asp?subPage=drug+Policy#type (last visited Oct.
21, 2002). The NFL allows testing to be done only during pre-season for banned
substances, and only during the season when the player is in an intervention stage,
as determined by the Medical Advisor. See id. Before a player reaches an interven-
tion stage, he is tested only for street drugs, and not other substances of abuse
under the drug policy. See Drug Policy: Confidentiality: Discipline, at http://www.
nflpa.org/members/main.asp?subPage=drug+Policy#type (last visited Oct. 21,
2002) [hereinafter Confidentiality: Discipline]. He must test positive for those drugs,
or refer himself to the team doctor to enter the Intervention Program, and be
tested for more serious performance-enhancing drugs on a more consistent basis.
See Drug Policy: Entrance into the Intervention Stages: Entrance, at http://www.nflpa.
org/members/main.asp?subPage=drug+Policy#type (last visited Oct 21, 2002)
[hereinafter Entrance into the Intervention Stages]. A player in Intervention Stage
One has no right to appeal the results of the testing, which can occur at the re-
quest of the Medical Advisor. See Drug Policy: Testing for Substances of Abuse: Testing
Procedures, at http://www.nflpa.org/members/main.asp?subPage=drug+Policy#
type (last visited Oct. 21, 2002). Even if not in an intervention stage, a player who
refuses to test and does not have a valid reason for doing so will be deemed to have
tested positive. See id.
76. See CBA Extension Features, at http://www.nflpa.org/members/main.asp?
subPage=CBA+Extension+Features (last visited Oct. 21, 2002) (displaying issues
such as salary cap and benefit problems worked out through extension).
77. See List of Prohibited Substances, at http://www.nflpa.org/shared/banned
Substances.htm (last visited Oct. 21, 2002) [hereinafter List of Prohibited Substances].
Among the drugs prohibited by the NFL are anabolic or androgenic steroids,
human or animal growth hormone, and diuretics. See id. Any detection of these
substances through testing results in a suspension for four regular or postseason
games for the first violation, and for six games for the second violation if the Medi-
cal Advisor directs. See Anabolic Steroids, at http://www.nflpa.org/members/main.
asp?subpage=anabolic+Steroids (last visited Oct. 21, 2002) [hereinafter Anabolic
Steroids].
78. See Anabolic Steroids, supra note 77. The policy also states that players may
be tested randomly throughout the season on a "blind basis." See id. Furthermore,
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more serious substances is not consistent until the player enters an
"intervention stage." 79 Finally, though the NFL's drug policy ap-
pears to be tough on performance-enhancing drugs, actual positive
tests are not made public because the collective bargaining agree-
ment mandates confidentiality of the results.80 Thus, the successes
and failures of the drug policy are therefore subject to serious
speculation. 81
2. Major League Baseball's View on Doping in Sport
MLB and the MLB Players Association, one of the most power-
ful professional players' unions, failed in their attempt to institute a
drug policy in June of 1984.82 The program began as a war "almost
exclusively against cocaine [abuse], . . . the most serious drug prob-
lem."83 MLB's 1997 drug program expanded the published list of
tested substances to include marijuana, opiates, and PCP, but not
for performance-enhancing drugs.8 4 The Medical Advisor for the
a player may be tested randomly on a "reasonable cause" basis, as determined by
past acts of the player or through a recommendation of the Medical Advisor. See
id.
79. See Confidentiality: Discipline supra note 75. A player only enters an Inter-
vention Stage when he has tested positive for street drugs or abuse of prescription
drugs, if he displays odd behavior, or through self-referral. See Entrance into the
Intervention Stages, supra note 75. NFL players are tested for anabolic steroids and
related substances as often as they are tested for street drugs, during the pre-sea-
son and then randomly over the year through a blind computer drawing. See Ster-
oid Policy - Full: Testing for Prohibited Substances, at http://www.nflpa.org/members/
main.asp?subpage=steroid+Policy+%2D+Full&section=3 (last visited Oct. 21, 2002)
[hereinafter Testing for Prohibited Substances].
80. See Confidentiality: Discipline, supra note 75. Any breach of this confidenti-
ality results in a heavy fine, which can amount to a maximum of $500,000. See id.
81. See Fox, supra note 7, at 272 (questioning whether NFL has same amount
of drug use as professional cycling).
82. See BERRY & WONG, supra note 69, at 473-74. This plan was the second in
professional sports behind the NBA to administer such a policy. See id. The initial
plan excluded drugs such as alcohol, marijuana, and amphetamines because it was
not feasible to regulate them at the time. See id. The policy was not implemented
because the new MLB Commissioner viewed it as insufficient. See id. at 473.
83. Id. Baseball has been notorious for cocaine users such as Steve Howe, a
relief pitcher for the Los Angeles Dodgers, and Alan Wiggins, a second baseman
for the San Diego Padres and Baltimore Orioles. See PAUL C. WEILER & GARY R.
ROBERTS, SPORTS AND THE LAW: CASES, MATERIALS AND PROBLEMS 43 (West Publ'g
1993). The major controversy that spurred MLB's drug program involved four
Kansas City Royals players who were arrested and convicted for cocaine possession
in 1983. See id.
84. See Memorandum from Bud Selig, Chairman of Major League Baseball, to
all Major League Baseball Clubs (May 15, 1997), available at http://news.findlaw.
com/legalnews/sports/drugs/policy/baseball [hereinafter Memorandum from
Bud Selig]. MLB prohibited the sale, use or possession of illegal drugs or con-
trolled substances, but MLB did not test randomly for any of these substances as of
yet. See id. MLB players were only tested if they had a history of problems with
15
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MLB administered testing four times throughout the year, under
the supervision of a trained collector.8 5
MLB also initiated an educational program termed the Em-
ployee Assistance Program or "EAP," which provided information
to the players about drug use and confidential counseling for those
with drug problems.8 6 This program, which was primarily volun-
tary, went beyond testing to ensure that players understand the dan-
gers associated with drugs.8 7 In the NFL, the Commissioner
ensures confidentiality of both test results and counseling.8 Unlike
the NFL, however, MLB formerly tested only for street drugs and
not for performance-enhancing drugs.89 Therefore, it was difficult
to determine how many of the MLB players used performance-en-
hancing drugs on a consistent basis.90
drug use and were never subjected to random testing in previous years. See id.
Minor league players were subject to random testing for illegal drugs throughout
the year, in order to deter drug use early in the player's career. See id. Due to a
new collective bargaining agreement between the MLB and MLB Players Associa-
tion ("MLBPA"), a random drug testing policy will be implemented starting in the
2003 season. See Carroll Rodgers, MLB Steroid Policy Unlikely to Be As Tough As NFL's,
ATL. J. & CONST., Aug. 8, 2002, available at http://www.accessatlanta.com/atc/
sports/0802/09drugs.html (stating MLB Commissioner Bud Selig already under-
stands limits of drug testing programs like NFL's and NBA's).
85. See Memorandum from Bud Selig, supra note 84. Players with a history of
drug abuse could be tested more than four times over the year. See id. The speci-
men produced was "divided into two containers, sealed against tampering, coded
to protect the anonymity of the individual involved and secured for transport to
the laboratory. Once at the laboratory, one sample would be analyzed and the
other stored for conformity testing." Id.
86. See id. The purposes of the EAP are: 1) to "provide basic education infor-
mation to players and personnel about the dangers of drug abuse," and 2) "[t]o be
a means of providing confidential, independent, and expert counseling .... Id.
This program is in place for both the minor and major league baseball players. See
id.
87. See id. (stating EAP is "backbone" of [MLB's] effort).
88. See Memorandum from Bud Selig, supra note 84. The policy provides for
confidentiality to the "maximum extent possible and as required by law," and any-
one found breaking this code is subject to fines. Id. The policy notes, however,
that any media attention to the problem is beyond the control of MLB. See id.; see
also WEILER & ROBERTS, supra note 83, at 42-46 (detailing disciplinary actions taken
against several MLB players found to be using drugs).
89. See Memorandum from Bud Selig, supra note 84 (noting only controlled
substances tested for are cocaine, marijuana, PCP, opiates, and amphetamines).
MLB may test for other substances, but only with prior notice given to the players.
See id. It is extremely likely, however, that a more "legitimate" steroid policy that
randomly tests all MLB players will be in place by the 2003 season. See Rodgers,
supra note 84, at http://www.accessatlanta.com/atc/sports/0802/09drugs.html.
90. See Rosenbloom, supra note 3, at C13 (finding Colorado Rockies player
was not going to jeopardize reputation by naming players who use performance-
enhancing drugs). Rosenbloom stated that the Rockies player might have said
more about what could be "baseball's dirty little secret," but he was warned by a
coach not to say anything. See id. Former St. Louis Cardinals player Mark McGwire
16
Jeffrey S. Moorad Sports Law Journal, Vol. 10, Iss. 1 [2003], Art. 9
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/mslj/vol10/iss1/9
2003] DANGERS OF PERFORMANCE-ENHANCING DRUGS 197
MLB's new policy, enacted as part of the 2002 collective bar-
gaining agreement, is the first measure towards banning the use of
performance-enhancing drugs in baseball. 91 MLB players will be
tested for steroids beginning in 2003, followed by more testing after
a determination that the use is widespread. 92 The agreement de-
clared that MLB would not mark steroids as prohibited sub-
stances. 93 The testing in 2003 will be administered through two
announced tests during the season. 94 The program levies fines or
suspensions for players who use performance-enhancing substances
or illegal street drugs. 95 Although MLB's new program is a small
stride to reducing drug use in baseball, it is at least progress.96
III. ANALYSIS
The testing procedures implemented by professional and ama-
teur sports were designed to reduce existing drug use among par-
ticipants and to deter others from beginning use.97 It appears,
however, that the testing mechanisms in place for many sports to-
brought creatine and androstenedione, now popular performance-enhancing
drugs, to the spotlight when he shattered MLB's home-run mark in the late 1990s.
See Kolb, supra note 9, at B1.
91. See Associated Press, Players Who Plead Guilty Face Automatic Suspensions
(Oct. 3, 2002), available at http://espn.go.com/mlb/news/2002/1O02/1440405.
html. The labor deal from 2002 expires December 19, 2006. See id. Drug posses-
sion convictions by MLB players lead to fifteen-to-thirty-day suspensions for the
first conviction. See id. A thirty-to-ninety-day suspension occurs if the player is con-
victed for a second time, and a one-year suspension and two-year suspension for
the third and fourth conviction, respectively. See id.
92. See id. Testing in the 2003 season determines whether an anti-doping pro-
gram will be implemented by MLB in 2004. See id. More than five percent of MLB
players must test positively for steroids for the testing scheme to be implemented.
See id. The program will continue indefinitely until less than a combined two and
one-half percent of MLB players test positively during a two-year period. See id.
Testing for street drugs, such as marijuana and PCP, can only be administered if a
health committee determines there is 'just cause." See id. The health committee
will consist of members from MLB and MLBPA. See id.
93. See id. The agreement did not ban steroids such as androstenedione, but
if more than ten percent of the players test positively for steroid use, the health
committee can prohibit its use in the future. See id. The committee would have to
vote unanimously to ban any substance. See id.
94. See id. The tests are administered during either spring training or the
regular season. See id.
95. See id. Marijuana use or possession results in a $15,000 fine. See id. Ster-
oid use levies a fifteen-day suspension or a fine of up to $10,000. See id. Further
positive tests for steroids by individual MLB players result in larger suspensions
without pay. See id.
96. See Associated Press, supra note 91, at http://espn.go.com/mlb/news/
2002/1002/1440405.html. MLB's new scheme is criticized because it lacks ran-
dom testing that is analyzed by an independent agency. See id.
97. See Marrazzo, supra note 1, at 79. The benefits of drug testing programs,
according to the NCAA, is to "promote safety for the athletes involved; [deter] the
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day are more of a pretense than an actual force against drugs.98
The anti-doping policies of athletics, especially professional athlet-
ics, resemble a public policy ploy to boost community perception
that drugs are not tolerated and that the integrity of play in sports is
sound.99 The policies presented by amateur and professional
sports have several loopholes, however, enabling athletes to cheat
testing procedures and excel at the sport using state-of-the-art per-
formance-enhancing drugs.10 0 Serious shortcomings in testing in-
dicate that it should not be relied on so heavily for adequate drug
deterrence.' 0 Indeed, many problems exist in testing mechanisms,
especially in what the tests probe for, who is tested, and when the
testing takes place.' 0 2
A. Most Testing Does Not Include
Performance-Enhancing Drugs
Drug testing of athletes is most crucial in high school and pro-
fessional sports, yet neither seems to test for performance-enhanc-
ing drugs.' 0 3 High school, where adolescents learn educational
amount of drug use by the athletes; educatfe] . . .the dangers of drug use; and
maintain [ ] the integrity of the university .... Id.
98. See Kolb, supra note 9, at BI (finding many athletes undaunted in efforts
to gain advantage over field and will use performance-enhancing drugs to achieve
goal). Studies have dictated that around 750,000 high school and junior high
school students have used anabolic steroids, mostly to appear "buff." See id. A
major concern also exists for new drugs that are being sold over-the-counter, which
have unknown problems and side effects. See id.
99. See Fox, supra note 7, at 277 (stating NFL must fight public perception
that its players are using performance-enhancing drugs to maintain market share).
Because the NFL directly benefits from the success of the league and the teams
that are playing well, it is logical to conclude that the NFL ignores successful play-
ers' use of performance-enhancing drugs if the players produce revenue. See id. at
276-77. Ultimately, there is a strong "incentive for the NFL to cover-up doping in
the game." Id. at 278.
100. See Diaz, supra note 59, at G3 (noting Olympic athletes are cheating to
win medals). Diaz detailed performance-enhancing substances such as human
growth hormone, which assists the growth of muscle tissue and cannot be detected
under the IOC's drug testing policy at the Olympics. See id. Furthermore, athletes
have become craftier in their use of such drugs, while the testing that seeks to
detect them has failed to keep pace. See id. (quoting Interview with Brent Rushall,
Exercise Scientist, San Diego State University (Sept. 15, 2000)).
101. See Greenblatt, supra note 10, at 657 (stating urine samples can easily be
doctored to produce false negatives).
102. See id. at 659-61. Athletes use performance-enhancing drugs to gain a
competitive advantage. See Kolb, supra note 9, at B]. To curtail performance-en-
hancing drug use in sports completely, athletes must learn that the problems asso-
ciated with the drugs heavily outweigh their slight benefits. See id. at B6.
103. See Kolb, supra note 9, at B6 (noting in states such as New Mexico, only
small amount of schools test for performance-enhancing drugs). The Olympic
athletes and the NCAA, however, do test for performance-enhancing drugs such as
[Vol. 10: p. 181
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disciplines and grow into adults, should be the first place for admin-
istrators to ensure that students do not use stimulants or anabolic
agents. 10 4 The Supreme Court has declared the safety of students
to be a valid government interest that outweighs the students' con-
stitutional protection from unreasonable searches and seizures.10 5
It would be logical, therefore, for the Supreme Court to authorize
testing in high schools for performance-enhancing drugs, as long as
the privacy and safety of the students are considered. 10 6
Televised sports like the Olympics and MLB, are also to blame
for the rise in students' use of performance-enhancing drugs. 10 7
Because neither of the organizations has regulated performance-
enhancing drugs successfully, fans have taken these supplements,
anabolic steroids. See NCAA Banned Drug-Classes, supra note 51 (prohibiting ana-
bolic steroids, stimulants, and diuretics in NCAA); List of Prohibited Substances and
Methods, supra note 6 (signifying same).
104. See Vernonia Sch. Dist. v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 661 (1995) (noting youth
is "time when physical, psychological, and addictive effects of drugs are most se-
vere"). The testing in Vernonia, however, only concerned street drugs and one
performance-enhancing drug, the stimulant amphetamine, which can also be a
street drug. See id. at 650. LSD, which is known for its harm to students, was tested
only upon request of the school district. See id. at 650-51. But see Survey, supra note
15, at 6 (finding that one in five youths know of someone taking performance-
enhancing drugs).
105. See Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 661, 664-65. The Court stated the nature of the
government concern was "important - indeed, perhaps compelling .... See id. at
661. It hardly can be doubted that testing already administered to students for
street drugs would be any more intrusive if it was examined for other drugs that
are not promoting any health benefits for students. See id. at 658 (observing pri-
vacy concerns during testing are "negligible"). In Vernonia, the Court permitted
suspicionless testing of student athletes, and reasoned the testing was constitu-
tional due in part to the limited intrusion on the students' privacy. See id. Because
the testing at issue only probed for illegal drugs, it did not disclose information
that would be intrusive. See id. Vernonia's principles were extended to drug testing
of students who participate in extracurricular activities apart from athletics in
Board of Education v. Earls. See Bd. of Educ. v. Earls, 122 S. Ct. 2559, 2569 (2002).
The Court in Earls determined the testing was not significantly intrusive, and
maybe even less problematic than the testing in Vernonia. See id. at 2566. The
testing in Earls, unlike in Vernonia, allowed male students to produce their samples
"behind a closed stall." See id.
106. See Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 664-65 (holding search through drug testing
reasonable because government interest in student safety outweighed minimal in-
trusion on students' privacy).
107. Compare Kolb, supra note 9, at BI (noting professional baseball player
Mark McGwire was promoting creatine, a performance-enhancer, during home-
run chase in late 1990s), with Survey, supra note 15, at 6 (finding that creatine was
cited fifty-eight percent of time by students as drug used by person they knew tak-
ing performance-enhancing drugs). Professional athletes are societal role models
and are emulated constantly by fans who want to be like them. See Marrazzo, supra
note 1, at 75.
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desiring to appear and perform like professional athletes. 10 8 The
WADA, for example, prohibits the use of human growth hormone,
but at the 2000 Olympic Games in Sydney, it had no way of testing
the substance's presence in athletes' bodies. 10 9 With this knowl-
edge, athletes can use performance-enhancing drugs to help them
succeed without detection through anti-doping tests.' 10 The testing
does not detect all banned substances, and therefore, athletes con-
stantly gain an unfair advantage over other participants because it is
clear that "the candy store remains open."'II
MLB also has serious hurdles to overcome regarding testing for
performance-enhancing substances. 11 2 In reality, because of the
strength of the players' union, baseball players are never subject to
random testing outside the four announced tests throughout the
year.' 13 MLB's new testing program does not ban performance-en-
hancing drugs. 1 4 Players in professional baseball, therefore, have
108. See Kolb, supra note 9, at BI; cf Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 662-63 (upholding
finding of district court that student athletes were source of drug use increase at
Vernonia School District).
109. See Diaz, supra note 59, at G3. Human growth hormone "promotes mus-
cle growth and bone strength." See id.
110. See id. (citing 1995 poll that found most Olympic athletes would take
performance-enhancing drugs if they could win and not be caught). When the
same athletes were polled about whether they would continue to take such sub-
stances even if they would die but keep winning for the next five years, half of
them said they would. See id.
111. See id. But see Baranova Tests Positive for EPO, at http://sports.espn.go.
com/oly/winter02/xcountry/news?id=1324203 (Feb. 6, 2002) (stating all endur-
ance athletes in 2002 Winter Olympics will be tested for popular performance-
enhancing drug EPO). Even though sports such as cross-country skiing would be
tested for EPO at the 2002 Winter Games, no indication had been made that ath-
letes in other sports would be tested. See id. Moreover, even if a urine test for EPO
is negative, the benefits of EPO to the human body on the athlete can last for
weeks after the test is administered. See Diaz, supra note 59, at G3.
112. See BERRY & WONG, supra note 69, at 473 (noting MLB had difficulties
implementing drug policy because of strong opposition by the MLBPA). The drug
policy of the MLB was originally enacted to deter and detect use of cocaine, a drug
that has plagued MLB for the last several decades. See id.
113. See Memorandum from Bud Selig, supra note 84. Baseball, however,
does have a system where players can come forward voluntarily with their sub-
stance abuse problems and receive help. See id. In addition, if a player that is
suspected of drug use is asked to undergo examination and refuses, he is subject to
testing or sanctions as determined by a review counsel. See BERRY & WONG, supra
note 69, at 473. The new policy for steroid testing will not test randomly either,
but will test twice during the year after players are given a one week notice. See
Associated Press, supra note 91, at http://espn.go.com/mlb/news/2002/1002/
1440405.html.
114. See Associated Press, supra note 91, at http://espn.go.com/mlb/news/
2002/1002/1440405.html (stating only health committee can ban substances
through unanimous vote); see also Memorandum from Bud Selig, supra note 84
(explaining old testing was conducted only for drugs like marijuana, PCP, opiates,
and cocaine). The NCAA, WADA, and NFL programs also detect the presence of
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virtually no deterrent from abstaining from the use of performance-
enhancing drugs. 115 MLB players may use such substances more
openly than in other sports, although their effects may be question-
able.' 16 Whether it helps or hurts a baseball player's performance,
the mere use of such substances conveys a message to younger play-
ers across the nation that cheating to win is acceptable as long as
the player is not caught.117 For this reason alone, anti-doping poli-
cies need to be strengthened to test every substance known to en-
hance performance, and educational programs need to be
implemented to uncover the dangers associated with the use of
such substances.' 18
B. Athletes Are Not Tested Often Enough to
Fully Detect Drug Use
Most professional and amateur sports subject their players to
random testing throughout the season, and sometimes in the off-
season.' 19 This testing scheme, however, does not ensure that play-
ers will be deterred from using stimulants or anabolic agents during
performance-enhancing drugs. See FAQ About Doping, supra note 5 (regarding ana-
bolic steroids, beta blockers, diuretics, and blood doping as prohibited); List of
Prohibited Substances, supra note 77 (detecting anabolic or androgenic steroids,
human or animal growth hormone and diuretics); NCAA Banned Drug Classes, supra
note 51 (testing for stimulants, anabolic agents, diuretics, street drugs, peptide
hormones, and analogues).
115. See Associated Press, supra note 91, at http://espn.go.com/mlb/news/
2002/1002/1440405.html. MLB prohibits the sale, possession, and use of drugs or
controlled substances. See id. It will begin testing for anabolic steroids in 2003. See
id. A positive test, however, may result only in a fine of $10,000. See id. There is no
random testing in MLB for either anabolic steroids or street drugs. See id.
116. See Greenblatt, supra note 10, at 663 (noting beneficial effects of use of
anabolic steroids depends on type of activity studied). But see Rosenbloom, supra
note 3, at C13 (interviewing Jeff Cirillo, Colorado Rockies player, who made direct
correlation between number of players with more than thirty home-runs per year
and number of players using performance-enhancing drugs).
117. See Marrazzo, supra note 1, at 76 (stating athletes are "public figures"); cf
Diaz, supra note 59, at G3 (arguing athletes are cheating to win even though televi-
sion coverage chooses to ignore it).
118. See Diaz, supra note 59, at G3 (noting IOC's anti-doping policy, one of
best in sports, has more holes than "one of Jennifer Lopez's dresses"). Forty-five
percent of parents questioned commented that they did not have enough knowl-
edge about performance-enhancing drugs to talk with their children about the
issue. See Survey, supra note 15, at 6. Seventy-two percent of students who knew
someone using performance-enhancing drugs had not been informed about the
drugs from their athletic teams. See id.
119. See Vernonia Sch. Dist. v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 650 (1995) (relating drug
policy tested consenting students once at beginning of season, then through blind
drawing once each week); Hill v. NCAA, 865 P.2d 633, 669 (Cal. 1994) (upholding
purely random drug testing policy of collegiate athletes).
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the season or off-season. 120 The NFL, for example, always tests dur-
ing the pre-season and then randomly through the regular and
post-season. 12' The problem with this scheme is that players have
an extremely low probability of being tested after the initial in-
stance in the pre-season.' 22 The NFL does not test for perform-
ance-enhancing drugs often enough to dissuade drug use
throughout the season. 123 Therefore, players in the NFL could
start taking performance-enhancing drugs after their first test in the
pre-season because of the low probability that they will be tested
again. 124 The testing procedures offered by the NFL could be
deemed a facade because the NFL would never unveil a huge dop-
ing scandal in its sport. 25 A public view that NFL players abuse
substances regularly would harm the players directly, and subse-
quently, the NFL would lose television ratings and profits. 26
Poor testing schemes also affect the NCAA, where non-football
players are tested at an even lower frequency, making it possible to
never be tested during the athlete's four years at college. 127 Profes-
sional sports, like MLB, have inferior policies because MLB tells its
120. See Greenblatt, supra note 10, at 660 (stating "programmed abstinence"
can produce negative test). A frequent cocaine user "need only abstain for a pe-
riod of one week or so prior to a scheduled urine test to ensure with reasonable
certainty that urine will be negative ...... Id. Only if the testing is completely
random, so that the athlete has no knowledge when the test will occur, would the
result be the most accurate. See id. (noting drinking large amounts of water also
helps bring drug concentration levels below prohibited amount).
121. See Testing for Prohibited Substances, supra note 79.
122. See id. (stating "players on every team" will be tested each week; however,
"players" include those from practice squads and reserves, who do not play in regu-
lar season games).
123. See id. (indicating that during season NFL does not require random test-
ing to include every player).
124. See id. (explaining that during season and post-season players on each
team will be tested randomly, but not signifying that every player on each team will
be tested throughout season). Even if a player does test positively for a perform-
ance-enhancing substance during the season, he might not be disciplined publicly
because bad press for the NFL directly hinders gross profits. See Fox, supra note 7,
at 277.
125. See Fox, supra note 7, at 277. It should be noted that the author's whole
premise, that the NFL conceals substance abuse by its athletes, rests on one major
assumption: "[T]here is as much doping in the [NFL] as there is in professional
cycling." Id. at 272. The author supports this assumption by suggesting that in
each sport there is a comparable pressure from outside sources to use perform-
ance-enhancing substances. See id.
126. See id. at 277 (calling anti-doping policy of NFL "public relations
stratagem").
127. See Program Book, supra note 48 (noting all athletes in every sport are
subject to testing at NCAA or league championships). A player who does not play
football, and does not travel to either the league or NCAA championships for his
or her sport may never be asked to produce a sample. See id.
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players ahead of time when they will be tested. 128 Therefore, MLB
players can abstain from using performance-enhancing substances
after the announcement with hopes that the remnants of the drugs
will have left the body. 129
The testing method at the Olympic level is also an example of
how anti-doping schemes are attractive on their face, yet only
meant to prevent public perception of cheating in sports.130 The
IOC, under direction of the WADA, tests only the top three finish-
ers and one randomly chosen athlete during the Olympic
Games.131 This anti-doping policy is effective in ensuring that ath-
letes who win are not cheating, but does little to protect the health
of every athlete because it fails to prevent all athletes from using
performance-enhancing drugs. 13 2 Accordingly, the testing only
tests as many athletes as necessary to dissuade media criticism of
doping in the games. 133
If athletes play sports as a "consensual activity, entered into by
individuals of their own free will," then the IOC and other Olympic
organizations should make participation contingent upon
mandatory, random testing of every athlete on a frequent basis. 13 4
Although some may argue this is an invasion of the at'ilete's pri-
128. See Associated Press, supra note 91, at http://espn.go.com/mlb/news/
2002/1002/1440405.html (stating new policy for 2003 season implements two an-
nounced tests for anabolic steroids).
129. See Greenblatt, supra note 10, at 660 (arguing MLB players using cocaine
could avert positive test result if they knew when test was to be administered).
130. See McLaren, supra note 63, at 379 (discussing disputes over who should
enforce Olympic anti-doping scheme). The USOC has been accused of promoting
performance-enhancing drugs to its athletes, and hiding tests that reveal its ath-
letes' drug use. See Notebook, supra note 20, at 5D. This assertion was refuted be-
cause it lacked a sufficient factual basis. See id. USA Track & Field was also accused
of covering up positive tests by athletes, especially after a major shot-putting star,
CJ. Hunter, reportedly failed four different drug tests before the Sydney Olympic
Games in 2000. See id.
131. See FAQ About Doping, supra note 5. Testing during other Olympic-re-
lated events, such as track and field competitions during non-Olympic years, is
administered at random. See Betz & Pilgrim, supra note 5, at 212 (stating random
testing occurs based on finish place).
132. See Pound, supra note 2, at 485 (arguing that sports, like life, have plague
of cheating). Despite the WADA's testing policy, Richard Pound, now the chair-
man of the WADA, claimed that the top concern was the health and safety of the
Olympic athlete. See id. at 486. This does not seem to hold true today if the pri-
mary concern of the WADA's drug testing policy is to prevent winners from cheat-
ing. See FAQ About Doping, supra note 5 (stating doping is against Olympic motto of
fair competition).
133. See Diaz, supra note 59, at G3 (observing that IOC tests only "during days
of competition").
134. Pound, supra note 2, at 485. As Pound suggests, consenting to an activity
equates with agreeing to certain rules. See id.
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vacy, voluntary consent by the athlete and the significant counter-
vailing interest of protecting the health and safety of all participants
should be sufficient to pass any federal or state privacy law. 135 Con-
sequently, the IOC and the WADA would be able to administer an
anti-doping policy which would eradicate completely testable drugs,
and fulfill its goal of protecting the health and safety of the
athlete. 1 36
The pursuit of glory and money should never prevail over the
health and safety of an athlete. 137 The NFL and USOC should ex-
pose fully all scandals they are accused of concealing and prevent
them from reoccurring. 138 The life of any athlete, whether he or
she is a high school student or a multi-million dollar professional
star, is not worth the price that the media and the public put on the
individual's performance on the field. 139 Amateur and professional
sports have made strides in anti-doping efforts; however, both need
to improve their testing methods to deter athletes fully from using
performance-enhancing drugs. 140
C. Accompanying Drug Testing with Additional Mandatory
Procedures May Be Best Tactic to Ensure
Drug-Free Sports
Anti-doping policies of professional and amateur sports have
relied heavily on drug testing as the major deterrent against using
135. See S.F. Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. United States Olympic Comm., 483 U.S.
522, 542-47 (1987) (holding Olympic organization was not government actor). Be-
cause the IOC is not a government actor, it likely would have to deal only with state
privacy laws, such as those the NCAA adddressed in Hill. See Hill v. NCAA, 865
P.2d 633, 657 (Cal. 1994) (stating NCAA as private actor was subject to privacy
initiative under California Constitution, although drug testing policy was held not
to be invasion of athletes' privacy).
136. See Pound, supra note 2, at 485 (observing initial purpose of drug policy
was to protect health of participants).
137. See Diaz, supra note 59, at G3 (stating White House Office of Drug Policy
reported that "lure of endorsement contracts ... makes performance-enhancing
drugs too difficult a temptation for athletes to ignore").
138. See Fox, supra note 7, at 277 (arguing NFL would never uncover doping
scandal in sport for fear of hurting image as "tough on drugs" and of "los[ing]
market share"); Notebook, supra note 20, at 5D (alleging USOC was hiding tests that
showed athletes used performance-enhancing drugs).
139. See Marrazzo, supra note 1, at 81 (commenting on amount of attention
given to athletes in contrast to other professions). The author explains that "[peo-
ple] rarely, if ever, pay to watch someone build a car." Id. Yet, fans "pay dearly" to
watch their favorite athletes. See id. Thus, fans demand "greater performances"
from these athletes. See id. Some experts believe athletes should not be treated
any differently than a normal member of society. See id. at 80-81.
140. See generally Diaz, supra note 59, at G3 (predicting wide-spread drug use
at Sydney Games despite IOC's rigorous drug testing).
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performance-enhancing drugs.14' When considering the inaccu-
racy of urine testing, it seems logical to devote more energy to de-
terring drug use before it begins by informing athletes of the
dangers associated with drugs that enhance performance and ap-
pearance. 142 Educational programs, which teach the hazards and
evils associated with all types of drugs, should be integrated with
anti-doping policies. 143 Most professional and collegiate sports only
offer optional counseling or educational procedures for the ath-
letes.144 Because the pressures of professional and amateur sports
are immense, counseling and educational programs should be
mandatory. 145 Students and professional athletes will then learn
about the serious risks that result from using performance-enhanc-
ing drugs. 146
141. See Greenblatt, supra note 10, at 652. The pressure by the media and
public to find an inexpensive solution to the drug problem gave rise to "[t]he
concept of mandatory random testing for drugs in urine... to meet that perceived
need." Id.
142. See id. at 665-66 (arguing that mandatory testing could create "police
state" by infringing upon "constitutionally guaranteed protections and freedoms"
for sake of deterrent effect that is "questionable" at best).
143. See id. at 661 (explaining cornerstone of alcoholism prevention is help-
ing person admit to and understand problem through counseling, not drug
testing).
144. See Memorandum from Bud Selig, supra note 84. MLB's new policy al-
lows players treatment if they admit voluntarily that they have a drug problem. See
Associated Press, supra note 91, at http://espn.go.com/mlb/news/2002/1002/
1440405.html.
145. See Crummy, supra note 4, at 229 (arguing drug education would pro-
mote health and safety of athletes while dispelling myths that performance-en-
hancing drugs help athletes in general); see also Marrazzo, supra note 1, at 91
(advocating need for athletes to find role models themselves). But see Hill v.
NCAA, 865 P.2d 633, 664 (Cal. 1994) (rejecting drug education as viable alterna-
tive to drug testing through urine analysis). Although the Hill court addressed
drug use by collegiate athletes within the last decade, it is highly doubtful it
imagined the sophistication of the modern performance-enhancing drug market.
See Diaz, supra note 59, at G3 (stating "candy store" is available for athletes who
crave drugs to boost performance). In light of the current growth of this practice,
courts may embrace an anti-doping policy that involves mandatory educational
programs. See id.
146. See Survey, supra note 15, at 6 (finding seventy percent of young people
surveyed could not recall side effect of using performance-enhancing drugs).
Ninety-six percent of the individuals surveyed were aware of the potential of health
problems arising from taking the drugs. See id. Of the youths surveyed, however,
more than seventy percent reported that their sports teams neglected to give them
any information on the topic. See id. For instance, anabolic steroids can cause
aggressive behavior, breast enlargement, liver complications, and serious side ef-
fects on male reproduction. See Greenblatt, supra note 10, at 664. Also, no con-
vincing evidence shows steroids or anabolic agents benefit aerobic activities, such
as running. See id. at 663.
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Most sports organizations do not make educational programs
mandatory for participation in the sport. 147 By requiring educa-
tional programs as part of the anti-doping program, athletes can
achieve an understanding of the serious problems of performance-
enhancing drug use before they use. 148 An additional benefit of
drug education would be the deterrent effect for those athletes who
formerly used performance-enhancing drugs. 149 Drug education
could "be a great improvement to the current program which
tempts athletes to merely avoid detection of drug use.' 50 Thus,
recognizing that drug education programs enhance drug use pre-
vention, heads of anti-doping agencies have contemplated educa-
tion as a deterrent for drug use in youth sports.' 5'
The best option for athletic organizations would be to combine
the current drug testing policies with mandatory educational pro-
grams, while still striving for better and swifter methods of de-
tecting drug use. 152 Because many sports organizations have
created drug testing policies already, it would be foolish to extin-
guish them. 153 Without education, however, many athletes at
younger ages will begin to experiment with performance-enhancing
drugs that can be purchased easily at stores across the country. 154
The current anti-doping policies of amateur and professional
sports have substantially evolved since their inceptions, but still
must advance considerably before all athletes are drug-free.' 55 If
147. See Drug-testing Q&A, supra note 49 (making it optional for NCAA institu-
tions to provide educational programs on drug use).
148. See Diaz, supra note 59, at G3 (recalling first Olympics gave money, food,
tax exemptions, and other rewards for winning).
149. See Crummy, supra note 4, at 229 (stating athletes could be educated on
alternatives to drug use to cope with problems faced). "Athletes often use drugs
for a variety of reasons besides enhancing performance, such as . . . coping with
stress and dealing with emotional confusion." Id.
150. Id. at 230.
151. See Kolb, supra note 9, at B6 (noting education is "real key" to deterring
drug use). Drug education is urged by many because of the harmful effects stem-
ming from performing-enhancing drugs. See id. Because the Food and Drug Ad-
ministration does not regulate performance-enhancing drugs, however, there is
much speculation as to the real effects on the human body. See id. at Bi.
152. See id. at B6 (arguing education might prevent athletes from "fall[ing]
victim to scientifically unproven . . . fads"). Effective testing by athletic organiza-
tions will also prevent a greater number of athletes from taking drugs. See Thorpe
Attacks, supra note 67.
153. See Kolb, supra note 9, at B6 (noting high school athletic director feels
drug testing has been deterrent at high school level).
154. See id. at BI (commenting that concern has grown over performance-
enhancing drugs that can be purchased over-the-counter).
155. See Diaz, supra note 59, at G3 (indicating IOC is helpless against sophisti-
cated masking agents that produce false negatives).
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the sports world is serious about banishing drug use, steps must be
taken to ensure that drug-testing programs are adequate enough to
deter athletes from using drugs to enhance performance. 156 First,
anti-doping policies must include performance-enhancing drugs in
the list of substances that in fact are tested. 157 Second, all athletes
must be tested consistently.' 58 Finally, anti-doping policies must ex-
pand to include drug education and other preventative methods to
deter drug use by athletes fully at multiple levels. 159 For anti-dop-
ing efforts to succeed, sports organizations must hold their own
players publicly accountable and not conceal their drug use.160 Un-
til all these problems are solved, drug use will remain an enormous
dilemma within competitive sports. 161
IV. CONCLUSION
Unfortunately, illegal drug use has plagued athletes just as it
has the rest of society. 162 Athletic organizations have made it their
goal to combat this problem through anti-doping policies. 163 These
policies focus on drug testing "to deter and detect drug use."'164
With the exception of high school athletic drug testing programs,
sports organizations have been immune from Fourth Amendment
156. See id. (arguing athletes everywhere are "cheating to win").
157. See id. (describing flaws in 1OC testing policy, including not testing for
certain banned substances); see also Vernonia Sch. Dist. v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 650,
664-65 (holding that high school drug testing policy that detected use of street
drugs only was constitutional).
158. See Testingfor Prohibited Substances, supra note 79 (observing players will be
tested at least "once per league year" in pre-season).
159. See Kolb, supra note 9, at B6 (stating education is crucial to curbing drug
use); Survey, supra note 15, at 6 (finding seventy percent of "young people" could
not recall specific side effect of performance-enhancing drugs, yet twenty percent
knew person taking substances).
160. See Drug Chief, supra note 70 (citing WADA chairman Richard Pound's
criticism of USA Track and Field officials' refusal to release names of athletes who
tested positively for drug use).
161. See Crummy, supra note 4, at 197 (observing NCAA should be concerned
with drug problem in athletics). Although drug testing policies have appeared to
improve, "the candy store remains open." See Diaz, supra note 59, at G3.
162. See Marrazzo, supra note 1, at 78 (noting athletics are "microcosm of
society").
163. See Martin, supra note 3, at 124 (observing drug programs attempt to
deter drug use).
164. See id. at 123.
27
Walker: Missing the Target: How Performance-Enhancing Drugs Go Unnoticed
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2003
208 VILLANOVA SPORTS & ENT. LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 10: p. 181
principles. 165 Therefore, many of the anti-doping programs are
subject merely to privacy issues and bargaining power. 166
Drug testing programs have progressed substantially since their
inceptions, yet they still receive heavy criticism for various rea-
sons. 167 The latest battles focus on whether drug testing policies
actually test the appropriate drugs to protect athletes fully and pre-
vent drug abuse. 168 Consequently, sports organizations such as the
WADA and NCAA have enlarged their banned substances lists to
include almost every conceivable performance-enhancing drug.1 69
The surge to ban every substance, however, does not mean that
every prohibited substance is tested. 170 Furthermore, even if the
substance is banned and tested, it does not follow that every player
will be tested for the substance during competition or during the
off-season. 171
It is necessary to substantially amend the anti-doping policies
of many sports organizations.' 72 Too many athletes are taking sub-
stances to assist their performance, which is affecting sports of all
types. 173 This produces problems in youth athletic programs be-
cause young adults tend to emulate their favorite player to gain a
165. Compare NCAA v. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 179, 199 (1988) (finding NCAA
ruling not state action), with New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 336-37 (1985)
(holding public school officials subject to Fourth Amendment of Constitution
through Fourteenth Amendment). Mandatory drug testing through urine samples
taken by public high school or state officials is a search and seizure under the
Constitution. See Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 617 (1989).
166. See Hill v. NCAA, 865 P.2d 633, 657 (Cal. 1994) (holding NCAA subject
to state privacy law under state constitution); see also WEILER & ROBERTS, supra note
83, at 42 (observing professional leagues and unions disagree on issues involved
with drug testing).
167. See Martin, supra note 3, at 124 (arguing testing programs are invasion of
students' privacy rights); see also Diaz, supra note 59, at G3 (suggesting IOC's drug
testing policy has major holes).
168. See Kolb, supra note 9, at BI (noting growth in use of over-the-counter
supplements to help athletic performance).
169. See Thorpe Attacks, supra note 67 (indicating testing for drug EPO, one of
most popular drugs for endurance purposes, was initiated in 2000 Olympics).
170. See Diaz, supra note 59, at G3 ("While announcing drug testing methods
to be used [at the] Sydney [Olympics], IOC president Juan Antonio Samaranch
admitted that some banned substances remain free of testing.").
171. See Testing for Prohibited Substances, supra note 79 (stating players are
tested at least once during pre-season and randomly during season). Yet, random
testing does not ensure that every player is tested at some point during the regular
season. See id.
172. See Diaz, supra note 59, at G3 (noting athletes are getting smarter at side-
stepping testing policies).
173. See Fox, supra note 7, at 271 (detailing drug scandal surrounding Tour
de France, cycling's most acclaimed event).
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competitive edge. 174 Performance-enhancing drugs have become
the new battleground in sports, as organizations seek "to redirect
sport back to its competitive roots without the influence of unfair
advantages and victory without honor."'175 Furthermore, because
performance-enhancing drugs are not subject to the policies of the
Food and Drug Administration ("FDA"), conducting more studies
is crucial to assess fully the true problems associated with such sub-
stances. 176 Congress and the FDA must corral this problem
through new, coherent legislation.1 77
The current drug testing scheme is inadequate to fight this
war, and much more needs to be done. 78 Mandatory education,
especially for youth sports, must become a cornerstone for drug de-
terrence. 179 Until athletic organizations' anti-doping policies in-
volve more education and truly efficient testing, athletes of all levels
will continue to use performance-enhancing drugs. 180
E. Tim Walker
174. See Marrazzo, supra note 1, at 75. Professional sports players have be-
come marketing products for many companies who seek to attain the success that
creatine has for professional baseball player Mark McGwire. See Kolb, supra note 9,
at B1.
175. McLaren, supra note 63, at 380.
176. See Kolb, supra note 9, at B6 (describing reported side effects associated
with creatine use).
177. See Spokes, supra note 55, at 194 (proposing regulation should be im-
posed in interests of consumer safety).
178. See Kolb, supra note 9, at B6 (arguing education is necessary to help erad-
icate drug problem in high school sports). Even though drug testing schemes are
implemented in schools occasionally, estimates show that around 750,000 junior
high and high school students have taken anabolic steroids. See id. at B1.
179. See Survey, supra note 15, at 6 (noting forty-five percent of parents did not
know enough about performance-enhancing drugs to speak with children); see also
Kolb, supra note 9, at Bi (indicating need for more studies).
180. See Diaz, supra note 59, at G3 (stating endorsement contracts for
Olympic athletes who win medals are sufficient to continue rise in use of perform-
ance-enhancing drugs).
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